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WELFARE REFORM AND THE POSSIBLE DEMISE OF WHITE
PATERNALISM AND BLACK FLIGHT IN MISSISSIPPI*
Lewis Walker and Chester L. Hunt
Western Michigan University

ABSTRACT
This article makes an assessment of the possible impact of welfare reform on families currently receiving AFDC payments. An analysis of the data on variations in
AFDC monthly payments, the per capital income and AFDC grants, and other selected
factors for Mississippi, Nebraska, and New York suggests that the effects of federalization on welfare would indeed be far-reaching. For example, it would increase
the economic level of Black mothers and children living in Mississippi (state with
the lowest monthly payment), and possibly at the same time decrease the flow of
Black emigration from that state.

Early in his term President Carter proposed a plan for welfare reform which
would shift the major responsibility from the states to the federal government and
lessen, if not eliminate, present state inequalities in benefits. This program has
little chance of enactment in the immediate future but it does address some of the
perennial problems of a welfare system almost universally assumed to be faulty and
it is likely that some day a similar program will be enacted. In the debate over
the program one thing often overlooked is the variation in regional impact. In the
northeastern states it is unlikely that welfare reform would lead to increased benefits for welfare recipients and conceivably it could lower them. In the deep
South and especially in the poorest state in the nation, Mississippi, its effects
would be revolutionary. The obvious or manifest effect would be a major increase
in Mississippi welfare grants, the latent effects involve significant change in
social and familial relationships.
The Carter Plan
According to President Carter, his Program for Better Jobs and Incomes would
"transform the manner in which the federal government deals with the income needs
of the poor and begin to break the welfare cycle." His plans calls for the elimination of three key components of the present system: 1) Supplementary Security
Income (SSI) for the blind, aged and disabled; 2) Food Stamp Program; and 3) Aid to
Families with Dependent Children. These benefits would be replaced by cash grants
to lower income people, determined on a national basis and paid by the federal government. Moreover, the plan proposes to provide "jobs for those who need work,
dispensing fairer and more uniform cash benefits, promoting family stability and
*Revision of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Welfare section of the
Society for the Study of Social Problems, San Francisco, September 3, 1978.

improving the self-respect of recipients.
the Editorial Research Reports:

'2

According to a succinct statement in

Carter explained that his welfare proposal consists of a "joboriented program for those able to work and a simplified, uniform,
equitable cash assistance program for those in need who are unable
to work by virtue of disability, are or family circumstances." Cash
benefits for Americans able but unwilling to work would be reduced.
Up to 1.4 million full and part-time public service jobs would be
created to persons unable to find employment elsewhere. These jobs
would pay the federal minimum wage and recipients would be required
to spend five weeks each year looking for non-subsidized employment.
The Program for Better Jobs and Income, Carter said, "will ensure
that work will always be more profitable than welfare and that a
profitable
private or non-subsidized public job will always be more
'3
than a special federally funding public service job.
CHART 1
WELFARE REFORM CHANGES
PRESENT SYSTEM

PROPOSED CHANGES

Format

3 Categories

1 Category
(Low Income People)

Benefits

Determined by State

Determined by Federal
Government

Cost

Shared by State and
Federal Government

Entirely borne by
Federal Government

Employment

Reliance on existing
jobs

Provision of Public
Service jobs

Critics of the Carter Proposal usually operate from a northern perspective.
They are afraid it might encourage a lower level of payment to the needy and they
doubt that the work incentive aspect of the program would be effective in a period
of high unemployment or needed in a time of prosperity. They also charge that the
public service jobs would be of the meaningless dead-end variety.
Such criticisms may have merit but in the deep South they fall into insignificance compared to the changes that bringing this part of the country under a national welfare umbrella would involve. To explore this point let us look at the
impact of welfare reform on families now covered by the AFDC program. While the
Carter welfare reform proposal would eliminate the AFDC label, the type of families

comprising the AFDC caseload would still be receiving welfare payments. AFDC is
the largest form of categorical assistance. Hence, an analysis of the effect of
federalization on this type of family will clarify the probable effect of the welfare reform proposals.
Mississippi, Nebraska, New York:

A Comparison

Variations in AFDC Monthly Payments
The program for Aid to Families of Dependent Children is currently operated on
a matching basis in which the contribution of the Federal Government is related to
the payment by the individual states. A rather complicated federal formula provides more assistance to poor states than to wealthy ones but it is still true that
the state's payment may be a considerable burden and there is a tendency for the
low income states to have smaller AFDC grants. This is indicated by the variation
in the monthly payments for AFDC families and is illustrated in Table 1. To analyze the effect of this variation, let us look closely at three states, using the
4
New York is taken as an
detailed information available in a 1973 HEW survey.
example of a high grant state, Mississippi the state with the lowest average grant
payment and Nebraska is about midway between New York and Mississippi.
Table 1
AFDC Payments, December 1977
Monthly Payment
Per
Family Individual

State

State

HIGH

LOW
Mississippi
South Carolina
Georgia
Tennessee
Texas
Alabama
Source:

$ 47
84
103
104
104
112

Monthly Payment
Per
Family Individual

$15
29
37
37
33
37

Hawaii
New York
Rhode Island
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Michigan

$369
366
311
310
310
310

$115
114
103
99
102
99

World Almanac, p. 217, 1979

If we look at various aspects of the AFDC families there are rather sharp differences between Mississippi and New York with Nebraska, as expected, occupying an
intermediate type of position.
First looking at the matter of the unmet monthly need in the family budget.
In New York, at only 81 cents per family, the unmet monthly need was practically
nonexistent. In Nebraska it was $48.08 and in Mississippi $128.56. Not only was
the unmet need greater in the other two states but the theoretical "budgetary need"

was lower. This was calculated at $300.61 per month in New York, at $265.11 in
Nebraska and at $223.00 in Mississippi. Most of the variation in the estimates of
budgetary need was apparently accounted for by a differential treatment of assumed
expenses for shelter, fuel, and utilities. These amounted to $27.34 in Mississippi
and $116.75 in New York or a difference between the two of nearly $90 per month as
contrasted to a difference of the estimated budgetary need of $77.00 per month. In
Nebraska the figure was $96.00, a difference with New York of about $20.00 per
month while the difference in total budgetary need was $35.00. These figures are
accentuated when it is mentioned that nearly a third (30.3%) of Mississippi recipients receive nothing at all for fuel, shelter and utilities as contrasted to under
six percent for both New York and Nebraska. It should be added that Mississippi in
1973 was not the most extreme state since Louisiana and West Virginia budgeted
nothing at all for these items.
AFDC has been used disproportionately by Black families; the national percentage in 1973 being 45.8 percent Black while in Mississippi it was 87.4, in Nebraska
28.3, and in New York 39.3 percent. In New York the race of approximately 30 percent of the recipients was listed as Spanish origin descent, which in most cases
presumably referred to the Puerto Rican population. Thus in New York the minority
group representation was about 70 percent of the population. In Nebraska it was
around 30 percent, but in Mississippi AFDC was overwhelmingly a program for Black
families.
Although Mississippi's AFDC recipients are a comparatively high percent of its
total population, the proportion of either Whites or Blacks receiving AFDC is lower
than in the other two states. The high total of AFDC in Mississippi is related to
the higher proportion of Blacks living in that state (see Table 2).
Table 2
1973 Proportion of Blacks and Whites Receiving AFDC in
New York, Nebraska, and Mississippi

State
New York
Nebraska
Mississippi

% of
Blacks in State
Populations

% Black
Population on
AFDC

% White
Population on
AFDC

Total
Percent on
AFDC

13.0
3.4
37.2

24.4
22.2
14.6

2.1
1.3
1.1

5.30
2.00
6.10

Sources:
Table 11, Public Assistance Statistics 1976, U.S. Department of HEW, Social
and Reh Services, Office of Information Systems, National Center for Social
Statistics
Table 9, Part 1, Demographic and Program Characteristics, Findings of AFDC
Study. Also, Table 3, Part II and Financial Circumstances, Findings of the
1973 AFDC Study.

The three states clearly illustrate the usual relationship between rural population composition, percent black and size grant (See Tables 2 and 3). New York
typifies the large urban industrial state with a high minority AFDC proportion and
high monthly payments, Nebraska represents the more rural state with a largely
White AFDC population and medium payments, and Mississippi is the extreme example
of a rural state with a largely Black AFDC population and low monthly grants.
States with a large Black rural population tend to have lower grants and this
is most pronounced in southern states which have both a substantial rural AFDC population and more than 50 percent Black AFDC recipients. In all the states in which
the AFDC populations was 13 percent or more rural and 54 percent or more Black, except Virginia, grants were under $131 per month. In states with a largely white
AFDC population but 13 percent or more rural, the grants ranged from $149 to $306.
In states with fewer than 13 percent of the AFDC population in rural areas the proportion of Blacks on AFDC was not related to the size of the payment. Thus, the
impact of low AFDC payments falls mainly on rural Blacks. It may be significant
that these rural Blacks live in states where, at least until recently, blatant racism was openly proclaimed as well as practiced. They also live in states where
the welfare rights movement has never been an effective force.
Per Capita Income and AFDC Grants
Variation in AFDC grants has only a slight relation to either per capita income or living costs. Mississippi per capita income is 63 percent of New York but
the AFDC payment is only 19 percent of the New York average.
Table 3
Per Capita Income, Unmet Need, Average Grant, Family
Budget and Percent Minority for Three Selected States

State
New York
Nebraska
Mississippi

% AFDC
Minority**

Family
Budget

Average Monthly
AFDC Grant

Unmet
Need*

70.8
36.5
87.7

$300.61
265.11
223.00

$269.99
151.46
52.61

.81
40.08
128.56

Per Capita State
Income 1973
$5,657
5,251
3,579

*Since family resources are considered when making the grant, the unmet need is
smaller than the gap between the grant and the budget.
**30 percent of the New York AFDC are listed as Spanish origin descent.
Sources:
Table 9, Part 1, Demographic and Program Characteristics, Findings of the 1973
AFDC Study. Also Table 3, Part II B, Financial Circumstances, Findings of
the 1973 AFDC Study.

AFDC grants do show some relation to Black female per capita income. In New
York in 1970 the average AFDC grant was $3,252 and the per capita income for Black
females was $3,319, indicating that the AFDC family grant was 98 percent of the average Black female income. In Mississippi the Black female income in 1970 was $964
and the average AFDC family grant was $560 or 58 percent of the average Black female per capita income. In 1970, 51.2 percent of the Black female workers in Mississippi were either service or household workers compared to 32.6 percent in New
York State.
Let us assume that there is a federalization of AFDC grants. In 1973 it would
have reqired a grant of $181 per month or $2,180.90 per year to meet (with other
family resources) the estimated needs of the Mississippi AFDC family. This would
have meant an AFDC grant equaling 226 percent of the per capita 1970 Black female
income.
It is also worthy of note that the 1970 per capita Black male income in Mississippi was $2,237 or about the same as an AFDC grant which would have met "recognized needs." The high rate of illegitimacy in Mississippi indicates a certain
resistance to marriage and it is doubtful that a welfare grant as large as the average black male income would make matrimony more attractive. 5 Indeed the evidence from income subsidies elsewhere indicates that a higher welfare income is
associated with increased divorce rates. 6 An adverse effect on the formation and
stability of the two-parent family does not necessarily justify rejection of an
adequate welfare program. It could indeed be argued that it is a net gain when
families are no longer held in matrimony by sheer poverty. However, it is intellectually dishonest for welfare reform advocates to ignore the evidence that higher
welfare payments may be accompanied by higher divorce rates.
Table 4
Black Male and Female Per Capita
Income and Annual AFDC Grants

State
New York
Nebraska
Mississippi

Black Male
Per Capita Income
(1970)

Black Female
Per Capita Income
(1980)

Annual AFDC Grant
(1970)2

$5,710
4,425
2,237

$3,416
2,124
964

$3,252
1,818
560

1. 1970 Census, Characteristics of Population, Table 47 for Mississippi and New
York.
2. Social Security Bulletin, Volume 34, January 1971, Table M-26.

Some AFDC Patterns in New York, Nebraska and Mississippi
The Mississippi AFDC program emerged in a state in which family life is still
linked to developments of an earlier era. One aspect of this is the strength of
the extended family. Nearly half of the AFDC children are illegitimate and more
than half are cared for in extended family households. More than four-fifths of
the mothers were born in this state. Almost a third of the mothers are employed
nut wages - even with AFDC grants - are inadequate for family needs. The survival
of the plantation pattern of white paternalism is seen in the fact that over 30
percent of the mothers live in houses which are rent free. Over half of the families live in rural areas are nearly ninety percent of the caseload is Black.
The New York AFDC family contrasts with the Mississippi AFDC family in almost
every respect. In terms of joint residence, the extended family is infrequent and
ist AFDC mothers and children live in separate households. Illegitimacy is
slightly lower than in Mississippi. Only a third of the mothers were born in New
York state. Grants meet the budgetary definition of adequacy and less than ten
percent of the mothers are employed. Nearly 99 percent of the AFDC families live
in urban areas. The caseload is three fifths minority and the percentage of the
total families receiving AFDC, both majority and minority, is nearly twice that in
Mississippi. In brief, the AFDC system in New York state fairly well reflects the
sentiment that the one-parent family is expected to maintain an independent household and to be entitled to the adequate public support in time of need.
Nebraska, as might be expected, is somewhat different from either of the other
states. A majority of the caseload is White although the proportion of Whites
receiving AFDC is lower than in New York and only slightly higher than in Mississippi. The proportion of Blacks receiving AFDC is greater than in Mississippi and
nearly as high as in New York. Slightly more than half the AFDC recipients were
born in the state. The proportion of illegitimate children is the lowest of any of
the three states and the proportion of children living in a non-maternal home is
halfway between New York and Mississippi. Approximately a fourth of the mothers
are employed and grants averaged fifty dollars a month below budgetary needs. The
Nebraska situation is influenced by the survival of rural attitudes in a legislature dominated by farming interests. There are, however, few Blacks living in rural areas and the Black proportion of the caseload is overwhelmingly urban as is
the White as well. Grants are larger than in Mississippi but not enough to meet
family needs and the proportion of mothers working, while slightly lower than in
Mississippi, is two and a half times a high as in New York. Nebraska AFDC seems to
be influenced by possible differences in the situation and attitudes of White and
non-White AFDC families as well as by resistance to the idea that the independent
one-parent family should be entitled to complete maintenance by public funds. However, Nebraska AFDC policies are definitely closer to New York than to Mississippi.
Most AFDC families are one-parent families. This was true of approximately 87
percent of the families in New York and in Nebraska and 80 percent of those in the
United States as a whole. For Mississippi it was true of only 74 percent. New
York and Nebraska have the AFDC-U provisions which allow for the inclusion of an
unemployed male parent but Mississippi does not. On the other hand, in 24 percent
of the households in Mississippi there was no adult recipient of AFDC, meaning that

the child lived with someone other than a parent. This was true in ten percent of
the families in Nebraska and in only about four percent of the families in the
state of New York.
Table 5
The Status of AFDC Families in Three States on Six
Selected Variables

Percent
Rent Free
New York
Nebraska
Mississippi
Source:

5.8
3.3
30.3

Percent in
None-Maternal
Home
15.9
22.9
53.8

Born
in
State
33.2
56.3
86.5

Percent
Illegitimate
36.7
26.4
44.5

Percent
Mothers
Employed
9.5
24.6
31.2

Percent
Rural
1.2
13.0
53.7

Table 12, p. 29, Findings of the 1973 AFDC Study, Part II-A and Table 10,
Findings of the 1973 AFDC Study, Part 1.

The same pattern was born out in the classification of AFDC families by head
of household. In the United States as a whole 69.1 percent were headed by a mother. In New York this was true of 84 percent of such families and in Nebraska of 77
percent but in Mississippi only 46.2 percent of the families were headed by a mother. In Mississippi the families were more apt to be headed by a male relative,
this being true of 17.4 percent as contrasted to a United States average of 7.1
percent; approximately 5 percent in Nebraska and only 1.5 percent in New York.
Other family relatives, presumably grandparents, were also important in Mississippi
where approximately 15 percent of the AFDC families were constituted in this fashion as against a United States average of 6.5; about 6 percent in Nebraska and
about 3 percent in New York state.
The figures on illegitimacy indicate that this was highest in Mississippi
where over 44 percent of the AFDC families had illegitimate children as contrasted
to a United States percentage of 31.5 percent; 36.7 percent in New york and only
26.4 in Nebraska. The number of illegitimate children per family was also greatest
in Mississippi where 18.5 percent of the AFDC families had three or more illegitimate children. This contrasts with a figure around eight percent for the United
States as a whole; about 12 percent in New York and about six percent in Nebraska.
Thus AFDC families in Mississippi were more likely to have illegitimate children,
to have a larger number of illegitimate children and to have someone other than the
mother as head of the household.
The Mississippi AFDC program seems to have supported an older pattern of family life. This is one in which the working mother is a common phenomenon, although
her wages may be low; in which illegitimacy is high, and in which relatives other
than the mother frequently manifest a willingness to care for needy children. In
fact, Mississippi is unique in that less than half of the AFDC families are headed
by mothers living in a separate household.

Possible Results of Welfare Reform
Even though there might be a regional differential, perhaps one as great as
the differences between states' budgets ($300 in New York and $223 in Mississippi
in 19'3), it is likely that federalization would reduce migration from south to
north. More than 70 percent of the New York recipients in 1969 were born outside
of the state and a third were born in a southern state. By contrast nearly 87 percent of the Mississippi AFDC mothers
were born in the state and most migrants had
7
come Irom other southern states.
This does not mean that northern welfare problems are primarily caused by a
migrant population or that southern Blacks usually are unsuccessful in adjusting to
northern urban enbironment. Indeed, available research indicates that southern
Blacks have higher average income levels than those born in the north 8 and are
less likely to be receiving welfare payments, although migrants since 1965 do have
slightly high AFDC rate. 9
The impact of welfare payments on interstate migration is a sensitive issue on
which it is impossible to obtain absolute proof. Sometimes an assumption is made
that Blacks are fleeing from southern racism and that the size of welfare payments
does not constitute a migration incentive. Racism, of course, is not a monopoly of
the South and the northern variety may be even more irritating. Further, Blacks
like Whites, are attracted by the sun belt. Undoubtedly the prospect of better
paid employment is a major factor in migration. Employment, however, is likely to
fluctuate and a welfare pattern in which the New York payment is seven times that
of Mississippi would certainly discourage a return to the South when unemployment
occurs.10
Although the migrant flow is already greater from North to South than vice
versa,11 it seems plausible that a system in which Mississippi welfare payments
were approximately equal to those elsewhere would have some effect on deterring migration northward. In spite of the success of migrant adaptation to New York, the
migrants do comprise a significant part of the welfare caseload and they do face
traumatic adjustments. A further diminution of the migration flow would restrict
the New York labor supply, but it might also decrease the number of welfare clients. On the other hand, if Mississippi women find that they can get either remunerative jobs or adequate welfare in their home state they are likely to remain in
Mississippi and to find fewer difficulties than they would encounter as migrants.
Any federalized program, including the Carter proposal, will raise substantially the incomes of poor families in states at all similar to Mississippi and in
the process wipe out the last remnants of white paternalism still found in rural
areas (see Table 5).
With higher cash grants both the extended family and white
planters would be less inclined to assist actual or potential AFDC families. The
extended family pattern in which AFDC recipients live with other relatives is also
likely to diminish. The AFDC family would be more likely to approximate the New
York family in which the typical household consists only of mother and children
living in rented quarters, with the mother not working. Although with the rise in
grants there would probably be more demand to pay for housing and less assistance
from extended family, it is also probably that the level of living in AFDC
households would rise to a significant extent.
There is a strong presumption that a significant rise in payments to Mississippi AFDC families would result in a reluctance of women to accept available jobs.

As a matter of fact, this was one of the findings in the Wilkinson and Ross assessment of a demonstration project involving higher grants for AFDC recipients in two
rural Mississippi counties,12 and was also the result in similar experiments in
other states where the increase in welfare payments was smaller than13 would be true
in Mississippi and where the available jobs were more remunerative.
Most welfare reform proposals include administrative provisions to force welfare recipients to work. Such provisions may satisfy the moral conviction that
idleness should be penalized but they have proved ineffective whenever they have
been utilized. This would undoubtedly also be true in Mississippi where the ratio
of welfare payments to earned income is higher than in most states. Mary Sanger
has summarized studies dealing with the effect of the size of welfare payments on
work effort and concluded that the disincentive to work has more effect on the lowest income households and more effect on women than on men. 14 Since Mississippi has the lowest income in the country the disincentive effect of increased welfare payments would be expected to be even stronger there than elsewhere. Larger
AFDC payments would probably attract a large number of both Black and White mothers. If the proportion of both races receiving AFDC approximated the New York percentages, this would nearly double the Mississippi total (see Table 2).
CHART 2
Current and Predicted Status of AFDC Families in Mississippi
Current AFDC Program
in Mississippi

Predicted Effects of Carter's
Program in Mississippi

Grants far below the "needs" level.

Grants will approximate the "needs"
level.

Majority of AFDC children live in
extended family households.

Majority of AFDC children will live
in mother-headed households.

30% of AFDC families get free rent.

Free rent will diminish along with
other types of white paternalism.

31.2% of the AFDC mothers employed.

Employment of AFDC mothers will
decrease.

Substantial tendency to move to
northern states.

Low income population will stabilize
in Mississippi and some may return
from northern states.

Only 14.6% of the Black population
are receiving AFDC compared to 24.4%
in New York

Proportion of population on welfare
will increase.

44% of AFDC children are illegitimate.

Illegitimacy will remain the same or
increase.

Conclusions
The involvement of Mississippi in a national welfare reform which would bring
approximately uniform payments across the nation with no more than cost of living
variation, would have striking effects. It would raise the economic level of Black
mothers and children, and it would diminish the flow of Black emigration from
Mississippi to industrial states. Among Blacks it would also raise the economic
position of the unmarried or separated mother in relation to either the married
woman or employed man.
At the same time it would probably weaken the cohesiveness
of the extended family since mothers and children would now have the resources to
maintain a separate household. Evidence from both Mississippi and other states
indicates that a higher level of welfare payment reduces the willingness to seek
and accept employment, thus decreasing the economic productivity of both the
individuals involved and the state as a whole.
Reaction to these changes will vary according to value premises and there are
some who will not see higher living levels for welare recipients as a clear gain.
Piven and Cloward maintain that welfare payments which are kept low or made difficult to secure, tend to depress the wages of the bottom strata of workers. 15
Certainly the level of welfare payments in Mississippi is consistent with its reputation as a state with low labor costs. Presumably housewives who profit from
cheap domestic help and farmers or industrialists seeking lower labor costs would
be disturbed by any effort to raise welfare payments. However, most others would
applaud the effect of increased welfare in raising lower income Mississippians
above the level of extreme poverty.
While the lineup on this issue is fairly clear, the reaction to some of the
latent changes involved in welfare reform is likely to be more confused. These
changes would result from the degree of economic independence which higher welfare
payments would give the the Black woman of Mississippi. The Black woman would no
longer be dependent on the extended family, the labor market, White paternalism or
a husband. In an era which has a general emphasis on women's rights, such increased female independence is likely to be seen as a social gain. In at least one
respect it might even be seen as strengthening family life since women who reject
low paid employment will be able to stay home and care for their children. In this
case increased protection for children would be balanced against the loss of productivity due to a decreased labor force and whatever harm is felt to result from
greater dependence on welfare.
Even more difficult to evaluate are the changes which might come about in the
position of the welfare recipient compared to either the working woman or the Black
male. Unless the work ethic is totally discounted, it is hard to be enthusiastic
about a system which would enable the welfare recipient to get more than twice as
much as the average working woman. Likewise, it is disturbing to the male parent's
sense of responsibility when welfare payments equal his own earnings. These factors also operate in New York and Nebraska but to a much lesser degree than they
would in Mississippi, given welfare reform.
Mississippi is the poorest state in the Union with a per capita income more
than 30 percent below the national average. What we are considering is the extension to Mississippi of welfare standards similar to those of the rest of the nation
while leaving the rest of the Mississippi economy essentially changed. Such a move
may be preferable to a continuation of the present pattern in which much of the

Mississippi population live in dire poverty. However, placing the welfare recipient in an economic position greatly superior to many of the fully employed would
alter relationships with resultant strains on family functioning.
An alternative plan of action might concentrate on general economic development in Mississippi rather than focusing primarily on welfare reform. Such economic development would raise living levels across the board and by increasing the demand for labor would be especially helpful to the lowest income strata. Further,
if economic growth were greatly increased, then welfare payments similar to the
national standard would be seen as giving normal care to welfare recipients rather
than setting them apart as a privileged group. In the context of rapid economic
development an approximation of national welfare standards by Mississippi would be
a logical step. In the absence of a generally improved state economy, the introduction of higher welfare levels in Mississippi would have a tendency to weaken or
at least modify the extended family, to weaken the work ethic, to work against the
formation and preservation of two-parent families, and to increase the stigma of
inferiority already endured by many Black males.
In summary, while the application of nationwide welfare standards to Mississippi would raise the economic level of those now covered by AFDC it might also
stimulate other changes more controversial in nature. A general pattern of economic development which would bring the Black population of the state closer to the
national level would be less socially disruptive. However, it is far more difficult to bring about a diffused economic growth than to simply raise welfare payments. Hence, there is reason to believe that eventually, and probably in the
fairly near future, the dissonance caused by a 7 to 1 variation of AFDC grants between Mississippi and the most prosperous states will be ended by legislation
bringing a greater degree of uniformity in welfare payments.
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